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During a World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle, December 1999, 
thousands of protestors took to the streets to voice vehement disapproval against the trade 
institution. Some commentators criticized them for having a rowdy, incoherent agenda and little 
understanding of the WTO. Despite this criticism, many trade law scholars referenced these 
protests as the moment that exemplified the questioning of the WTO's legitimacy.' Legal 
literature usually assumes that the WTO's legitimacy has been severely challenged and asks: 
how can we make the WTO more legitimate? 
The Ministerial conference that failed to commence in Seattle, restarted in 2001 in Doha with 
what was dubbed by Member State negotiators and policy-makers as the "Development Round". 
The Doha Development Round is part of a call not only by WTO Member States but also by 
individuals and groups alike to make the WTO an institution for development and to ensure that 
world trade is a means for development. How this is to be done is a deeply contested issue 
evidenced by the stalled Doha Round negotiations and recent scholarly exploration.2 
This paper explores the relationship between these two events of the last decade: the perceived 
legitimacy crisis of the WTO and the emergence of development onto the global trade agenda.3  
My general argument is that the WTO legitimacy debate in trade law literature can be understood 
as a proxy for a development debate. By reconstruing the legitimacy debate as a development 
debate, I show how implicit within legitimacy arguments are competing conceptions of the 
WTO ' s function and purpose and that these conceptions are embedded within a broader 
development framework. 
* S.J.D. Candidate (University of Toronto), LL.M. (Harvard), LL.B. (Queen's), B.Sc. (Western). An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the American Society of International Law, Biennial International Economic Law 
Interest Group Conference, 14 November 2008, Washington D.C., USA and the Critical Legal Conference, 12 
September 2009, University of Leicester, UK. I wish to thank Kerry Rittich, Michael Trebilcock, J. Patrick Kelly, 
Riddhi Dasgupta, Morag Goodwin, Andrew Lang and Ronnie R. F. Yearwood for their comments on earlier drafts. I 
am also indebted to B.S. Chimni and Frank Garcia for their encouragement. All errors are mine. 
See for e.g. Michael Trebilcock, "Critiquing the Critics of Economic Globalization" (2005) 1 J. Int'l L. Int'l Rel. 
213. 
2 
 See for e.g. Andrew Charlton & Joseph Stiglitz, Fair Trade For All: How Trade Can Promote Development, rev. 
ed. (2007); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Free Trade Reimagined: The World Division of Labor and the Method of 
Economics (2007); and Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic 
Growth (2007). 
Cf. Tomer Broude, "The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflection on the Functional and 
Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO" (2006)45 Columb. J. Tranat'l L. 221. 
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The premise of this paper is that before we continue to engage in the necessary discussion of 
how to examine the WTO's effects upon marginalized comniunities4 and how to reconfigure the 
WTO in order to "reclaim" development in the world trading system,5 we must better understand 
what development frameworks already prevail within current debates. 
This paper also responds to the broader concern regarding the dearth of examinations of 
international institutions that are at once legal, theoretical, and descriptive.6 The WTO debate, 
much like debates regarding international institutions in general, thus far has been primarily 
prescriptive.7 
 That is to say, jurists have focused on arguing as to what conditions are necessary 
to enhance the WTO's legitimacy. This stems from the assumption that the WTO as a project is a 
good thing and therefore its legitimacy must be improved. This paper, however, is a descriptive 
assessment of the legitimacy debate. It examines why commentators call for certain WTO 
reforms. Because very little descriptive work has been done regarding the WTO legitimacy 
debate, this paper is a sketch of the beginnings of what a larger descriptive project may entail. 
Admittedly, this paper is ambitious in its scope but modest in its proposal. 
My primary purpose is to intervene into the debate in order to encourage a sharper, more defined 
discourse by suggesting that instead of simply defending the WTO, commentators should be 
clearer as to what is their conception of the WTO and explain why their conception is accurate 
and/or meritorious. This papers shows that examining the WTO only through the prescriptive 
lens of legitimacy obscures exactly what people are "for" or "against" in debates regarding the 
WTO. Thus, this paper looks to provide the tools to answer the question, "What conception of 
the WTO is being defended?" 
The divisions between arguments in the legitimacy debate are usually understood to be between 
rule-based constitutionalization versus economic rights constitutionalization, sympathy versus 
skepticism regarding non-governmental participation, and support for a more legalized dispute-
settlement system versus a more politicized dispute-settlement system. By reconstruing the 
legtithacy debate as a development debate, I first show how constitutional discourse is a way of 
arguing for the primacy of markets or international institutions over the state, dispute settlement 
debates are negotiating the relationship between the WTO and the state, and participation and 
transparency arguments stem from a concern for the role of the state in global governance. 
Second, I show how the binaries in the legitimacy debate are not as stable as originally thought. 
"B.S. Chimi, "The World Trade Organization, Democracy and Development: A View From the South" (2006) 40 J. 
World Trade 5. 
Yong-Shik Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006); Asif H. Qureshi, "International Trade for Development: The WTO as a Development Institution?" (2009) 43 
J. World Trade 173, 
6 
 Jan Kiabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, 2nd ed. (2009) at 32-35; José E. Alvarez, 
International Organizations as Law-makers (2005) at 586. 
Jens Steffek, "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach" (2003) 9 Eur. J. Int'l Rel. 
249. 
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What at first seem to be incongruent positions appear to be more related. Likewise, certain 
positions that at first blush appear to be similar, are revealed to arise from different conceptions 
of the WTO's function and purpose. What is ultimately revealed is that different conceptions of 
the WTO do not necessarily predicate a particular normative vision - how a specific conception 
of the WTO associates with a particular normative development framework depends which 
aspect of the WTO's legitimacy is being debated. 
I detail what I mean by reconstruing the legitimacy debate as a development debate and the 
limits of a "legitimacy" discourse in Part II. I then examine three forms of the legitimacy debate: 
constitutionalization (Part III), dispute settlement (Part IV), and participation and transparency 
(Part V). Part VI concludes. 
II. RECONSTRUING THE LEGITIMACY DEBATE ToWARDS 
DEVELOPMENT 
The debate surrounding the WTO is often framed as questioning whether the current operation of 
the WTO makes it a legitimate international institution. Scholars will usually enter the debate 
informed by a pre-existing conceptual construction of the WTO's function and purpose. The 
pattern of the debate is often that the WTO is assumed to institutionalize a particular notion of 
trade, then it is argued that the WTO should be changed in order to better adhere to this notion of 
trade or it is criticized for prioritizing trade as a value to the exclusion of other values. The 
preconception of the WTO is thereby reinforced through the way the WTO is examined.8 
Preconceptions of the function and purpose of the WTO and legitimacy not only affect the 
analytical framework in which the WTO is examined, but also shape policymaking within the 
WTO's institutional and bureaucratic structure.9 
The problem, however, is that allowing legitimacy criteria to affect descriptive understandings of 
the WTO makes it difficult to establish what actually is the function of the WTO and argue what 
it should be. Rather than exploring the structure and effects of the WTO, questions regarding the 
WTO are framed within preconceived notions of legitimacy of what the WTO should be doing. 
In this paper, I flip the orthodox approach on its head and examine the legitimacy debate to 
8 
 Patricia Nanz, "Democratic Legitimacy and Constitution alisation of Transnational Trade Governance: A View 
from Political Theory", in Christian Joerges & B-U Petersmann, eds., Constitutionalism, Multilateral Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (2006) 59 at 62. 
See for e.g. Peter Sutherland et al., The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges In The New 
Millennium (Geneva: WTO, 2004), online: <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/l Oannive/future_wto_e.htm> 
(the "Sutherland Report"). Cf. Joseph Weiler, "The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the 
Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement", in Roger B. Porter et al., Efficiency, Equity, And 
Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System At The Millennium (2001) 334. 
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understand the different pre-existing conceptual constructions of the WTO. A close reading of 
the literature using this approach presents the WTO legitimacy debate as a development debate. 
To reconstrue the debates regarding legitimacy towards development, we can consider the WTO 
legitimacy debate to be between different styles of functionalism. Functionalism, especially in 
discussions of law and development, administrative law and governance, focuses on the purpose 
that legal institutions serve and the objects of regulation in economic and political life.10 In fact, 
functionalism has dominated how international institutions in general are examined." When 
debating the WTO's legitimacy, differences arise through varied conceptions of the WTO's 
function and purpose and objects of regulation in global economic and political life. 
Broadly, there are two approaches to conceiving the function and purpose of the WTO that 
inform the legitimacy debate. What I call the economic functionalist approach focuses on the 
economic benefits of the WTO. This approach suggests that the WTO's legitimacy is increased 
the more the WTO's structure and resulting state action best reflect a particular trade theory. The 
assumption is that the purpose of the WTO is to discipline countries to liberalize trade by 
lowering tariffs, quotas, and so-called non-tariff barriers, which efficiently generates welfare. 
The different forms of welfare generated by liberal trade considered include increases in 
economic growth, market competition, and/or personal liberty. The more the WTO reflects the 
appropriate theory, the more opportunity there will be for increased welfare (however defined), 
thereby increasing the WTO's legitimacy. The other conception of the WTO, what I call the 
institutional functionalist approach, usually takes for granted that free trade generates welfare 
gains and focuses on improving technical and policy cooperation between Member States within 
the WTO by making the rules clearer and more coherent. The WTO 's legitimacy is increased by 
improving the WTO's internal regulatory coherence and/or by aligning the WTO regulations 
with other norms of international law. 
I will show how each conception is implicitly embedded within a development framework. By 
development I mean prescriptions as to how to change social, economic, and political structures 
to advance a community's welfare (however defined).  12 
 And by development framework I mean 
a prescribed role and relationship amongst of the state, market, law, international institutions and 
non-governmental actors. Outlining what substantive details of a development framework are 
associated with each conception of the WTO provides a sharper account of what is at stake in the 
legitimacy debates. 
Since I have presented the different conceptions as a stylized representation, and for the sake of 
space, I do not provide exhaustive references to all relevant texts. Showing the limitations and 
10 
 Kerry Rittich, "Functionalism And Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations In Contemporary Development And 
Governance Debates" (2005) 25 U.T.L.J. 853 at 855. See also Peer Zumbansen, "Law after the Welfare State: 
Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law" (2008) 56 Amer. J. Comp. L. 769. 
11 Alvarez, supra note 6 at 17-29. 
12 
 draw my definition of development from Gunnar Myrdal, 
" 'Growth' and 'Development", in Gunnar Myrdal, 
Against the Stream: Critical Essays on Economics (1973) 182. 
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tensions of economic and institutional functionalist arguments is not intended to be a critical fait 
accompli, but rather it is a way to craft analytical tools that can start a sharper development 
debate with a clearer understanding of the function and purpose of the WTO. '3  
III. C ONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The WTO is commonly used as an example of the constitutionalization of international law. I 
focus on the works of John H. Jackson and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmaim as two influential exemplars 
of different conceptions of constitutionalization and the WTO. Jackson considers the 
"constitution" of international trade law to mean the institutional reflection of however the world 
trading system actually operates in practice. The world trade constitution is whatever emerges 
from international trade institutions and as such, WTO law embodies the current trade 
constitution. To Petersmann, free trade enhances individual autonomy and liberty by freeing 
economic activity and protecting individual action from government interference. Free trade is 
considered to be a human right of utmost priority. Accordingly, since the WTO embodies this 
dedication to free trade, it represents the global constitutional notion of the right to trade. 
The critiques of constitutional discourse with respect to the WTO and trade has been that it is a 
discourse that privileges specific notions of legal forms such as judicial norm-generation,  14  that it 
prioritizes economic freedom over political freedom,  15 and that it takes for granted the social and 
economic benefits of liberalized trade.  16  The debate has involved answering the questions: is the 
WTO constitutionalizing? And if so, should the WT-0 be constitutionalizing? Deborah Cass has 
argued that this is an extremely restrictive question because it reifies the WTO as something that 
someone is either for or against and that: 
[i]t says that it is not possible to answer 'is-or-is-not', or 'should-or-should-not' question 
because the very terms of the discussion already presuppose the existence of the 
13 
 In this paper, I leave it open as to the merits of a functionalist approach. I implicitly eschew functionalism in 
Michael Fakhri, "Law as the Interplay of Ideas, Institutions, and Interests: Using Polanyi (and Foucault) to Ask 
TWAIL Questions" (2008) 10:4 Int'l Community L. Rev. 455. 
14 
 Ruth Buchanan, "Legitimating Global Trade Governance: Constitutional And Legal Pluralist Approaches" (2006) 
57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 654 at 662 
15 
 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global 
Subsidiarity?" (2003) 16 Governance 73 at 74. 
16 
 Deborah Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and 
Community in the International Trading System (2005) at 69. 
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phenomenon. This makes it virtually impossible to escape from the terms of the 
assumption in order to try to answer the constitutionalizing question.'7  
When reconstrued as a development debate, Jackson's arguments present an institutional 
functionalist understanding of the WTO, whereas Petersmann presents an economic functionalist 
version. With these insights we can follow Cass's suggestion to consider the development 
implications of constitutional models in terms of distribution of wealth and power. 18 
B. INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONALISM 
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
Jackson, was one of the first (if not the first) to use the term "constitution" when discussing the 
international economic system.19 
 In recent scholarship, Jackson has explained that he uses 
"constitution" as a moniker describing the institutional structure of the "world trading system" as 
whatever norms and practice emerge from international trade institutions; the concept of the 
constitution is flexible and adaptable to the changes in the international trade institution.20 
Jackson's concept of constitutionalization can be summarized as such: 
The trade "constitution" is composed of a complex mix of economic and governmental 
policies, political constraints and legal norms. 
The "constitutional" constraints that the legal norms generate may frustrate decision-
makers and economists, but they are necessary to manage competing policy goals in an 
interdependent world. 
The rule-oriented structure of the WTO is its greatest strength for it creates a predictable 
system, iilows for redressing unfair power imbalances between nations, and prevents 
escalating international tensions. 
To Jackson, the WTO functions as an international system of predictable and stable rules 
intended to overcome politics and government short-sightedness. The "constitutional structure" 
'7 lbid. at 208. 
18 jbid at 242. 
19 
 In this section 1 draw from the following work of John Jackson: World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969); The 
World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Relations, 2  ed. (1997); The World Trade Organization: 
Constitution and Jurisprudence (1998); "The WTO 'Constitution' and Proposed Reforms: Seven Mantras 
Revisited" (2001)4 J. of Int'l Econ. L. 67; Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law 
(2006); "International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting" (2000) 3 J. of Int'l Econ. L. 3; "Fragmentation 
or Unification Among International Institutions: The World Trade Organization" (1999) 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 
823. 
20 
 Seven Mantras, ibid. at 70-71; Changing Fundamentals, ibid. at 49-53, 55. 
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of world trade is composed of the international treaties, national institutions, and compliance 
with results of dispute resolution. International treaties are the paramount component of this 
constitutional structure. Over time, Jackson shifted in his scholarship from talking about the 
different laws that make up the world trade system constitution to talking about the "WTO 
constitution" implying that the world trade constitution primarily consists of the WTO. 21  
Cass has argued this institutional functionalist approach generated an assumed legitimacy and 
authority in regards to the WTO .22 The assumptions stemmed from international economic law 
scholars taking for granted the benefits of liberalized trade and the ability of international 
economic law to increase economic welfare.  23  Cass suggests the expansion of the WTO's scope 
and functions beyond those of the GATT led legal scholars to conflate concepts of institutions 
and constitutions.  24  The literature, with Jackson as the primary proponent, had a sense that a new 
Grundnorm was emerging because the new system possessed a unity and coherence associated 
with the development of a new legal order. This conflation was furthered by the desire to 
distinguish the old GATT system from the WTO due to the perception that the WTO was 
remarkably different than the GATT. So, the GATT was described as an institution whereas the 
WTO was a constitution. Once the WTO was conceived as a constitution, legitimacy (a core 
element of constitutionalization) emerged as a primary focus. Influenced by scholarship on 
"globalization", the lines between economic, political, and legal authority blurred making it seem 
plausible that the WTO is a political-legal constitution. The popular protests against the WTO, 
which are a paramount moment that enhanced the discussion of legitimacy with regards to the 
WTO, very likely furthered the use of constitutional discourse and its preoccupation with 
legitimacy. 25 
2. THE CONTOURS OF A DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
To begin to gain a clearer understanding of Jackson's development framework, I examine his use 
of the term "globalization" and its relationship with his conception of the function and purpose 
of the WTO. Jackson considers "globalization" as an inevitable force that has arrived. He 
acknowledges the ambiguity of the term "globalization" and states that it denotes the 
interdependence generated by developments since World War II in technology, communication, 
2! 
 The World Trade Organization: Constitution And Jurisprudence, supra note 19 at 103. For an evolution of the 
use of "constitution" compare John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 1st ed. (1991) at 299-301 and The 
World Trading System, 2d. ed. (1997), supra note 19 at 339-341. 
22 
 Cass, supra note 16 at 64 
23 
 Cass notes economic benefits of liberalized trade were assumed despite challenges to international economic law 
from scholars employing third-world approaches to international law, ibid. at 78-79. 
24 1b1d at 28-59. 
21 1b1d at 63. 
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and transportation that effectively integrate all markets into a global market.26 There is, however, 
in Jackson's conceptual framework a tension between "globalization" and the WTO. It is not 
clear whether the WTO's purpose is to manage institutional and cultural difference as a response 
to globalization or whether the WTO's purpose is to affect domestic countries and institutions in 
order to generate globalization.  27 
 Of course, these purposes are not mutually exclusive. But the 
result of leaving the WTO's role in globalization unclear is that presents the WTO as both 
inevitable and desirable. This is problematic because makes it difficult to identify the legal 
structures that affect or construct global markets. 
This problem is pertinent within Jackson's framework given that he considers the legal structure 
of the WTO as central to the global economy. Jackson lauds the WTO as an exemplar of the 
rules-based approach that avoids power imbalances between nations and the influences of 
domestic politics. 
 28 
 According to Jackson, the rule-based approach allows for the WTO to 
manage power between nations, achieve "optimal" government response, help national 
legislatures avoid being beheld by a specific set of constituents, and overcome actors in national 
executive bodies making decisions driven by their own personal goals. The power-based 
approach is avoided because the WTO refers to agreed rules to settle disputes instead of resorting 
to negotiations. 29 
To Jackson, the WTO's rule-based system is structured by law which implements an economic 
ideal. Jackson suggests we must understand that the primary principle of the WTO rules has to 
do with economic affairs. 
 30 
 He looks for guidance on how to manage the global economy by 
referencing economists that consider the market to be a paramount social institution.31 Jackson 
relies on economic theories that dictate that the international economic system should embody 
the idea of "liberal trade", which is defined as the trade policy whose "goal is to minimize the 
amount of interference of governments in trade flows that cross national borders. ,32 
Jackson acknowledges that "economists instruct us, that there both winners and losers in this 
process [of reducing trade barriers]. The basic concept of decades ago was that the advantages 
create a rising tide that lifts all boats. We now realize that not all boats are lifted, for one reason 
or another."33 
 To Jackson, however, liberal trade theory leaves the issue of distribution 
unanswered because it is a political or "non-economic" matter. Accordingly, any detrimental 
26 The World Trading System, supra note 19 at 5-7. 
27 
 Compare for e.g. Changing Fundamentals, ibid. at 122; and Constitution and Jurisprudence, supra note 19 at 103. 
28 Constitution and Jurisprudence, supra note 19 at 89. 
29 The World Trading System, supra note 19 at 350- 351; and "Times That Are Interesting", supra note 19 at 5. 
30 
 "Fragmentation", supra note 19 at 824. 
31 See for e.g. "Fragmentation", ibid. at 825; Seven Mantras, supra note 19 at 69-70. 
32 The World Trading System, supra note 19 at 11. 
33 
"Seven Mantras", supra note 19 at 69. Seer also The World Trading System, supra note 19 at 20. 
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domestic effects caused by the international trade system are to be addressed domestically and 
not by re-examining the international structures that may be causing these detriments. 
Domestic transformations created by international legal effect will create "losers" who are at 
times, according to Jackson, driven by irrationality or emotion.  34  When outlining that there are 
winners and losers that emerge from a liberal trade policy, Jackson considers that losses will be 
ameliorated through domestic "safeguards" and "adjustment" - despite not being too confident 
as to how economically or politically effective "safeguards" and "adjustments" are.35 All this 
suggests that international trade law should primarily focus on regulating the market and not on 
distributive effects. 36 
Moreover, according this view, international economic law should also consider whether "the 
nimble, well managed multinational corporations find their effective power enhanced by these 
international economic trends,"37 implying that corporate actors are to be privileged to bring 
about intended socio-economic changes. Where Jackson looks to corporations to support 
normative economic change, he has an inherent mistrust of government's role in the market. The 
described role of international economic law is to limit what governments can do with respect to 
border measures and "non-tariff barriers" affecting trade. This desire to limit government's role 
stems from the assumption that countries inevitably act as rational actors who seek to maximize 
their own welfare without regard to other countries, and that national legislatures are usually 
beholden to particular constituents or government actors strictly driven by personal interest. 38 
Jackson assumes that governments, in order to enact the best economic policy, need the help of 
the WTO to overcome constraints of domestic politics and personal interests. But he does have 
faith in government's ability to devise the appropriate "rule-based" system for international 
cooperation .39  By emphasizing that international economic law is primarily about treaties and 
that the WTO (created by international treaty) is the primary international economic legal 
institution, Jackson shows some deference to national governments.  40  Within this framework, 
- 
however, it is not clear as to why natlonaLgovermuents are inherently mistrusted to- manage 
domestic economies and trade policies, but trusted to negotiate treaties and create international 
institutions. Also, Jackson notes that a liberal trade regime creates losses that can materially and 
emotionally affect people. Jackson leaves it to domestic politics to address these losses. This 
34 The World Trading System, ibid. at 24; "Seven Mantras", supra 19 at 69. 
n The World Trading System, ibid. at 174-179; and 199-200. 
36 
 See Changing Fundamentals, at 86-87; The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, at 101-
102; and "Seven Mantras" at 70, all supra note 19. 
37 The World Trading System, supra note 19 at 24. 
38 
 The World Trading System, ibid. at 350- 351; "Fragmentation", supra note 19 at 825; "Times That Are 
Interesting ", supra note 19 at 5. 
39 The World Trading System, ibid. at 122. 
40 Ibid. at 122. 
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begs the question of why are national governments left to ameliorate the detrimental affects of a 
liberal trade regime if there is an assumption that governments cannot be expected to act in the 
broader interests of the nation. 
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C. EcoNoMIc FUNCTIONALISM 
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
The most vigorous and contested41 proponent of imagining the WTO as a constitution has been 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. He considers trade to be a human right and the WTO a human rights 
constitution.  42  Petersmann's concept of constitutionalization can be summarized as such: 
- There are universal and inalienable human rights reflected by the fact that more than 100 
international treaties and UN resolutions reaffirm these rights.  43  
- "Human rights" include liberty, non-discrimination, rule of law, social welfare, freedom 
of information, freedom of the press, property rights, and freedom of contract.  44  
- These human rights protecting individual autonomy and liberty constitute a "freedom of 
trade". ' 
- The WTO embodies an international dedication to this freedom of trade. 46 
- Therefore, (drawing from the EU experience) to ensure the WTO's legitimacy, the WTO 
must be interpreted within the broader human rights context and be considered as a 
constitution (the "world trade constitution") amongst the other international constitutions, 
and domestic constitutions (what he calls "multilevel constitutionalism"). 47  
'° See for e.g. Robert Howse, "Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional Justice: A Reply" 
(2008) 19 EJIL 945; and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Human Rights, International Economic Law and Constitutional 
Justice: A Rejoinder" (2008) 19 EJIL 955, 
42 
 In this section I draw on the more recent writing of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann: "Time for A United Nations 'Global 
Compact' for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European 
Integration" (2002) 13 E.J,I,L. 621; "The 'Human Rights Approach' Advocated by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization: Is It Relevant for WTO Law and Policy?", in Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, ed. Reforming The World Trade System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance 
(2005); "Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism", in Christian Joerges & 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, eds., Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (2006). 
'° See "Human Rights Approach", ibid. 
' See "Integrating Human Rights", supra note 42 at 622, 627; and "Human Rights Approach", ibid. at 359. 
' See "Multilevel Constitutionalism", supra note 42 at 33 and 45. 
' This is implicit in Petersmann's arguments. See for e.g. "Human Rights Approach", supra note 42 at 374-376 
(arguing that 1994 Agreement establishing the WTO provides that it is intended, amongst other things, to protect 
individual freedom, non-discrimination, and rule of law). 
' See "Multilevel Constitutionalism", supra note 42. Similarly, see John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movesian, "The 
World Trade Constitution" (2001) 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511 (makes similar economic arguments as Petersmann but 
draws from US constitutional discourse). 
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The general normative critique is that Petersmann prioritizes economic liberty and attempts to 
ossify this via constitutional discourse.  48 
 The human rights critique against Petersmann is that his 
understanding of human rights is a particular one yet it is presented as universal.49 Petersmann 
draws his definition of human rights primarily from Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and Friedrich 
Hayek in a manner that assumes that these thinkers form a coherent theory of human rights, that 
this theory is unquestionable, and that any disagreement is inaccurate. He has also been critiqued 
for buttressing his argument by presenting as a "fact" that international human rights, as reflected 
in the plethora of treaties, support his vision, ignoring the high level of contestation (politically, 
diplomatically, academically) within human rights discourse of the relationship between 
economic, social, civil and political rights thereby privileging economic liberty.50 Furthermore, 
Petersmann ignores one of the core debates in human rights discourse regarding its universal 
characteristic. He assumes that human rights are universal and necessarily normatively good and 
that his vision of rights is the inevitable one. 51 
The methodological critique of Petersmann is that he slips between a normative and descriptive 
argument and is vague in his terminology. Petersmann is arguing at the same time that the WTO 
should be constitutionalized in order to further the freedom of trade and that it is 
constitutionalizing already and therefore must be interpreted within the context of human rights. 
52 
2. THE CONTOURS OF A DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 
What is rarely examined within this intense debate is the theory of development underlying this 
particular constitutional vision. Petersmann considers the WTO to be the embodiment of ideal 
values and therefore looks to further legitimize the trade institutions through constitutional and 
human rights discourse. His priority is to enhance individual liberty and autonomy. Accordingly, 
the market is thought to be the ideal mechanism to achieve this liberty. Petersmann considers the 
WTO to be an institution that structures the global market. Therefore, he wants to protect and 
further strengthen the WTO's power and prominence against governments captured by groups 
48 Howse and Nicolaidis supra note 15; and Robert Howse, (2002) "Human Rights in he WTO: Whose Rights, What 
Humanity? Comment on Petersmann" (2002) 13 EJIL 651. 
' See Philip Alston, "Resisting Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann" 
(2002) 13 EJIL 815. 
50 bid. 
 
51 One debate in human rights that regularly reoccurs revolves around questioning whether there is, can be, or should 
be a universal human rights. Current human rights discourse has taken a turn towards the reflexive. See for e.g. 
Brooke Ackerly, Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference (2008); David Kennedy, The Dark Side of 
Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (2004); Makau Mutua, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the 
Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001)42 Harv. Int'l L. J. 201, 
52 
 Cass supra note 16 at 162-167; and Alston, supra note 49 at 818-820; and Howse and Nicolaidis, ibid. 
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seeking to change the legal system for their economic benefit.  53  The WTO as a constitution will 
discipline and rule over governments. 
Petersmann's framework demands that domestic states and institutions conform to a set of ideals 
that he considers desirable and universal. The market is considered the paramount institution, not 
because it generates growth most efficiently (like Jackson's argument), but rather because it is 
the sphere that best ensures personal autonomy and liberty. The WTO as a constitution provides 
the main tool for individuals to use to agitate against the intrusiveness of the state. 
Petersmann wants to shift decision-making power and the power of changing institutional 
practice away from government towards the trade policy elite within the WTO. Thus, the main 
actors for social change in Petersmann's development framework are the trade elite who 
structure the global market and individuals who ensure the national governments do not interfere 
with individual liberty. Understanding how a liberal trade regime affects economic growth and 
distribution has a secondary role in Petersmann's framework - the liberalization of trade is an 
end goal in and of itself as a human rights value. 
Petersmann wants to empower the individual to overcome the government because he assumes 
government will necessarily infringe upon the individual's interest. 54 It is the trade policy elite 
that with their specialized knowledge and dedication to a liberal trade regime that will best 
structure the WTO in ways to optimally affect international and domestic law. Individuals, can 
then in turn pressure their own government towards economic liberty by invoking the 
constitutionalized WTO through domestic courts.  55  
As a development framework, Petersmann's notion of constitutionalism and the WTO does not 
provide instruction as to how people with competing values may interact amongst each other. It 
assumes that most individuals desire a state with a reduced regulatory role. In his focus on 
contesting the role of the state, Petersmann assumes that the role of law and legal institutions is 
to limit government action through individual action. Petersinann's implicit development 
framework also presupposes the state already has domestic legal institutions in place (courts, 
administrative tribunals, etc.) that an individual can effectively use to reduce the regulatory role 
of the government. 
D. CONCLUSION - IRONIC ROLES FOR MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 
53 See "Multilevel Constitutionalism", supra note 42 at 44; and International Trade Law and GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement System, supra note 42 at 114-115. 
54 
"Multilevel Constitutionalism", ibid. at 26. 
55 lbid. at 35. 
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Jackson's concept of the WTO emphasizes the institutional structure as a constitution yet 
considers the market to be the normatively paramount social institution based on the premise that 
the market generates growth most efficiently. Petersmann's constitutional argument, which 
focuses on economic rights and prioritizes the market, considers the WTO as a paramount 
institution to discipline national governments. The role of domestic institutions, according to 
Jackson, is to ameliorate the detrimental effects of free trade 
- despite Jackson's reserved 
confidence in the ability of domestic institutions to achieve this goal. Petersmann relies on 
domestic institutions as necessary to limit the role of government, and looks to the WTO to 
buttress these domestic institutions. The irony is that that Jackson's institutional functionalist 
conception of the WTO prioritizes the market, whereas Petersmann's economic functionalist 
conception of the WTO prioritizes the international trade institution. 
Despite certain differences their remains commonalities in these implicit development 
frameworks. Both frameworks delineate an "economic sphere" that is separate from a "political 
sphere". They consider the "economic sphere" a place where actors shaped by the market, 
achieve the best welfare (however defined) for society and consider the "political sphere" as a 
place best avoided or limited. Also, both approaches prescribe a shift of decision-making power 
and the power of changing institutional practice away from government towards the trade policy 
elite within the WTO. 
IV. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
- METRICS OF LEGITIMACY 
The role of the dispute settlement system is a central concern in WTO legitimacy discussions. 
Members of the Appellate Body (AB) itself consider the issue of legitimacy merits 
consideration;  56 
 some suggest that concern with WTO legitimacy may influence how dispute-
settlement decisions are made.57 
56 In reading the number of essays written by former AB members, WTO legal staff, and private counsel that appear 
before the WTO, there is an implicit purpose of needing to legitimate the dispute settlement system. See for e.g. 
Giorgo Sacerdoti, "Appeal and Judicial Review in International Arbitration and Ajudication: the Case of the WTO 
Appellate Review", in B-U Petersmann, ed., International Trade Law And The GA TT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
System (1997) 247; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann "Six Years on the Bench of the 'World Trade Court", in Frederico 
Ortino & E-U Petersmann, eds., The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003 (2004) 499; Steve Charnovitz, 
Debra Steger & Peter Van den Bossche eds., Law In The Service Of Human Dignity: Essays In Honour Of 
Florentino Feliciano (2005); and Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson eds., Key Issues In WTO Dispute Settlement: The 
First Ten Years (2005). 
57 Robert Hudec, "GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an 'Aim and Effects' Test (1998)", 
in Robert Hudec, Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law (1999) 359 at 375-376. 
2009] RECONSTRUCTING THE WTO LEGITIMACY DEBATES 15 
The legitimacy of the WTO's dispute settlement system has primarily been measured against 
metrics of efficiency, efficacy and legality. Examinations of efficiency and efficacy are often 
made together and take-up a considerable amount of legal scholarship. Efficiency is measured by 
the least wasteful use of time and resources. Efficacy is measured by whether states comply with 
WTO rules or whether the WTO liberalizes trade. Compliance arguments propose ways in which 
member states can be pushed to adhere to WTO rules and the dispute settlement results. Trade-
liberalization arguments suggest ways to use the dispute settlement mechanism to ensure that 
member states adopt appropriate economic policies. 
Legality is measured by determining whether the law produced by the dispute settlement bodies 
is coherent and cohesive. The WTO dispute settlement is commonly understood to be a judicial 
entity despite formal monikers of "reports" and "appellate body" instead of decisions and courts. 
The dispute settlement system, and the AB in particular, generate debates familiar to readers of 
legal scholarship, and especially to those who follow legitimacy debates concerning domestic 
courts. In this light, the AB is considered to be attempting to generate different legal doctrines to 
give itself,  and therefore the WTO, increased legitimacy. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE - THE TENSION BETWEEN STATE AND THE WTO 
Arguments regarding the purpose of the dispute settlement system, the role of adjudicators, and 
method of interpretation characterize different notions of the relationship between the WTO and 
the state. Underlying all three measures of legitimacy is a concern with trying to resolve disputes 
in a manner that is legally consistent and coherent while maintaining the co-operation of 
participating countries. This tension has been characterized as one between the law of the WTO 
(the .need for to resolve disputes in a coherent and cogent manner) and the politics of state 
negotiation and institutional adherence (the need for states to want to function under the auspices 
of and adhere to the WTO). Some suggest this tension is acute enough to contribute to the 
WTO's legitimacy crisis.58 Those who want a more politically informed dispute resolution 
system argue that state adherence is the most important factor to be addressed - if the Panels and 
AB do not take into account the ramifications of their decisions, states will either ignore the 
judicial decision, which weakens the WTO 's legitimacy. Others argue that a rigorous legal 
analysis is more important because it establishes legitimacy by ensuring that the coherent 
structure of the WTO is maintained. 
Indeed, some suggest that the relationship between international institutions and their member 
states is the central tension for all international institutions that has been theoretically unresolved 
58 
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, "Tensions Between The Dispute Settlement Process And The Diplomatic And Treaty-
Making Activities Of The WTO" (2002) 3 World Trade Review 302. 
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for decades .59 Rather than attempting to find the hypothetical golden mean between law and 
politics, I will show how unpacking the theories of the role of the dispute settlement system and 
reconstruing discussions as a development debate allows us to see how underlying normative 
assumptions regarding the WTO's function and purpose and the state's role in global governance 
shapes conceptions of dispute-settlement. 
The different ways in which the three legitimacy metrics are used to overcome the perceived 
tension between law and politics is what distinguishes economic and institutional functionalist 
arguments. Economic functionalist arguments emphasize the economic benefits of the WTO and 
often use notions of legitimacy that focus on the ability of the dispute settlement system to 
discipline states to liberalize trade (efficiency and trade-liberalization efficacy). Institutional 
functionalist arguments emphasize the legality and institutional structure of the WTO by looking 
to theories of legitimacy that encourage the dispute settlement system to produce coherent legal 
doctrine alongside the need to ensure that states comply with WTO rules (efficiency, compliance 
efficacy, and legality). 
Institutional functionalists will either call for more political considerations to inform dispute-
resolution or argue for the WTO adjudicator to find the balance between legal consistency and 
member state adherence. Accordingly, the role of the judge is central to the institution building 
of the WTO since her job is assumed to be about navigating the law in a legally coherent and 
cogent way that ensures state compliance and not just to "apply the law". The power of the judge 
stems from the (assumed) fact that Member States construct the WTO due to a willingness to 
cooperate. Since state's needs are a mix of the economic, social, political, etc., the judge is to 
find the right balance between all these needs of the state within the framework of the WTO. 
Within this approach, the trade dispute settlement is argued to be more effective the more 
countries participate and comply. All this stems from an assumption that that the role of the 
WTO is to manage the relationship between states on trade related matters. Regardless of 
whether the argument is for more politics or for balancing, this characterization of the WTO 
considers the role of the judge as a primary vehicle to mediate betwee law and politics through 
her interpretation. 
Economic functionalist assume that the purpose of the WTO is to discipline governments to 
adhere to free trade principles. In this characterization of the WTO, governments know that in" 
'tying their hands to the mast' (like Ulysses when he approached the island of the Sirens), 
reciprocal international pre-commitments [like the WTO] help them to resist the siren-like 
temptations from 'rent-seeking' interest groups at home."60 The WTO embodies a conception of 
a particular trade theory and its legitimacy is derived from the inherent benefits articulated by 
this theory. The judge derives her legal doctrine from this nonnative theory; her role is to 
sharpen doctrine towards achieving the benefits from this theory. Though country participation 
59 Kiabbers, supra note 6. 
60 
 Petermann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System. International Law, International Organizations and 
Dispute Settlement, supra note 42 at 36-37. 
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in the dispute system and the WTO is necessary, ultimate efficacy is measured in terms of how 
well the WTO acts to discipline governments towards liberal trade policies. 
Considering that state compliance is necessary to any theory of dispute resolution legitimacy, 
empirical studies that measure use and adherence to the system are common. With regards to the 
consideration that developing countries do not use the dispute system to its full capacity, 
arguments are made to increase technical assistance for developing countries to use the dispute 
settlement system, which in turn would increase the dispute settlement system's legitimacy. 
Empirical studies can buttress both institutional and economic institutionalist arguments since 
the quantitative results do not in and of themselves address why countries should adhere and use 
the adjudication system. 
The institutional functionalist emphasizes the role of the adjudicator as mediator and primarily 
determines legitimacy by measuring state participation. The economic functionalist emphasizes 
the role of the adjudicator as the implementer of WTO rules and determines legitimacy by 
measuring trade liberalization. This means that the economic functionalists place the WTO rules 
and institution as a paramount over the state, whereas the institutional functionalist considers the 
WTO rules and state interest as something to be balanced. 
Economic Functionalist - Institutional Functionalist 
WTO Law 
4' WTO Law 4 4Panel/Appellate 
Panel/Appellate Body Body4 *-State 
40 
State  
Box 4.1: Frameworks of the Role of Law and Adjudication 
The different development frameworks can be fuither discerned from the different theories of 
law. According to economic functionalists, states created the WTO and comply with WTO law 
because of the expected welfare gains. States need the pressure of the dispute settlement system 
to overcome domestic obstacles blocking liberal trade policies. WTO adjudicators must thereby 
draw from a specialized knowledge of economics and use law as an instrument to implement the 
appropriate normative theory. 
To economic functionalists, the perceived tension between WTO law and state politics is 
resolved by the expected welfare gains of liberal trade theory. This framework, however, by 
turning to economic theory does not necessarily resolve the tension. Economists debate whether 
a trade regime should reduce tariffs, reduce government involvement in the market, remove 
discrimination between domestic and foreign produced goods, increase competition, or 
combinations thereof, or all of the above. The economic functionalist approach is not informed 
by economic debate, rather it inherently mistrusts the state's capacity to determine and 
implement appropriate economic policy, and places the debate within an elite group of decision-
makers acting in an adjudicative capacity. 
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The institutional functionalist's core concern, regardless of whether the argument is to ensure 
state adherence or legal coherence, is to preserve the WTO's institutional structure. The main 
focus is on the role of the judiciary to "balance" between the WTO trade rules (law) and the 
states' intents (politics). When some scholars think the judiciary is too isolated from the politics 
of state action they will argue for a more politically savvy judiciary that is attuned to states' 
needs to ensure their participation in the WTO. When the judiciary is considered too teleological, 
arguments for legal coherence are made to ensure the WTO ' s institutional integrity. Finding the 
point between law and politics, however, is predicated on assumption regarding the purpose of 
the WTO. If the purpose of the WTO is to ensure that states adhere to rules that liberalize trade, 
then an argument focused on doctrinal coherence is appropriate because the assumption would 
be that that coherent, cogent law will allow states to overcome power politics. This position, 
however, will always be vulnerable to a critique that that if the dispute settlement system remains 
focused only on doctrinal coherence and not on states' needs, states may not comply thereby 
reducing the integrity of the WTO. If the purpose of the WTO is act as a forum for states to 
negotiate, then an argument for a more politicized judiciary makes sense in order to ensure 
states' needs are met. In turn, this argument will always be vulnerable to the critique that the 
judiciary would then act as apologists for powerful states. In order to overcome this deadlock, a 
more productive approach would recognize the competing visions of the WTO's function and 
purpose and explicitly debate why the WTO or state should be the more important site of global 
governance. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Whether the role of the WTO adjudicator is imagined to be an institution-builder or trade 
technocrat, we can understand the legitimacy debate regarding WTO dispute-resolution system 
as a discussion about the tension between the WTO and the state. Rather than attempting to 
"resolve" this tension, I have outlined how unpacking the respective theories regarding the role 
of adjudication shows the correlation between understandings of the dispute settlement system 
and development frameworks. 
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V. TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION" 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Discussions regarding non-govermnental participation and WTO transparency focuses on 
whether non-governmental actors (whether individuals, corporations, NGOs, civil society, or 
social movements) should concentrate their energy upon the state or the WTO. The debate is 
between those who are concerned with the legitimacy and capacity of the state to decide matters 
that have global effect (state-centric arguments of global governance) versus those concerned 
with the legitimacy and capacity of the WTO to decide matters that have global effect 
(institutional-centric arguments of global governance). These participation and transparency 
debates, like the dispute-settlement debate, can be understood to be about the relationship 
between the WTO and the state. Within the context of the dispute-settlement system, it is a 
matter of argument as to what the hierarchy should be between the WTO and the state. In the 
context of participation and transparency discussions, however, the starting assumption is that 
the WTO in fact dominates national policy-making capacity and the question is whether to 
encourage or ameliorate the effects of this supposed fact. 
In this section, I first summarize how the terms of participation and transparency debate, when 
understood as a legitimacy debate, is between state-centric arguments versus institutional-centric 
arguments. I show that a state-centric argument correlates with an economic functionalist 
conception of the WTO and an institutional-centric argument correlates with an institutional 
functionalist conception. 
I then examine how the debate shifted from before to after 1999 and show that there is no 
necessary correlation between an argument regarding participation and a particular development 
framework. I thereby argue that in order to understand the development implications of 
participation and transparency arguments we need to know more than whether someone is 
calling for increased participation or not. As such, this section provides the beginnings of how 
we might discern the development implications of this debate. 
61 
 The literature in this area is extensive. For a recent symposium on the topic see 11:4 J. Int'l Econ. L. (2008). Other 
notable examples include Julio A. Lacarte, "Transparency, Public Debate, and Participation by NGOs in the WTO: a 
WTO Perspective, in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., Reforming the World Trade System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, and 
Democratic Governance 447 (2005); Robert Howse, "For A Citizen's Task Force on the Future of the World Trade 
Organization" (2004) 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 877; Steve Charnovitz, "Transparency & Participation in the WTO" (2004) 
56 Rutgers L. Rev. 927; Robert Wai, "Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and 
Around the International Trade Regime" (2003)13 EJIL 35, 73-80; Steve Charnovitz, "WTO Cosmopolitics" (2002) 
299 NYU J. Int'l L. & Pol. 299; Christophe Bellman & Richard Gerster, "Accountability in the World Trade 
Organization" (1996) 30:6 J. of World Trade 32. 
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B. LEGITIMACY DEBATE 
1. PRE-1999 
From the advent of the WTO, commentators debated the relationship between non-governmental 
actors and the WTO. At first, the focus was on inclusion of these actors, but after 1999 WTO 
transparency also became a prominent issue. Discussions regarding participation before 1999 did 
not consider non-governmental movements and organizations as potentially radical interventions 
questioning the legitimacy of the WTO. Rather, the starting premise was usually that the WTO is 
unquestionably a good thing because it embodies the ideas of "comparative advantage", leaving 
the debate regarding non-governmental participation to be about whether their inclusion will 
undermine the function and purpose of the WTO. 
The central question was where should decisions that have global effect, matters of "global 
governance", be decided. Scholars were generally divided between those that were more state-
centric and primarily concerned with strengthening the role of the state, wanting to leave all 
discussions of governance to domestic forums  62 
 versus those that were institutional-centric who 
were confident in the legal personality, integrity, and robustness of the WTO to deal with global 
issues. 63 
State-centric arguments characterized institutional-centric arguments as undermining state 
sovereignty and WTO functionality. The primary reasons for excluding non-governmental actors 
from the workings of the WTO were: 
1) Opening up the WTO will distort the decision-making process and may lead to special 
interest capture. The purpose of achieving free trade will be undermined; 
2) Non-govermnental actors are not representative or electorally accountable. The 
appropriate democratic forum for these actors is their respective domestic government; 
3) Northern non-governmental actors and issues will dominate Southern non-
governmental actors and issues; and 
4) The WTO would be undermined due to the cacophony of voices muddling discussions 
between governments. Moreover, the WTO cannot fairly determine which non-
governmental actors should be in and which should be out. 
62 
 See for e.g. Philip M. Nichols, "Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to 
Nongovernmental Parties" (1996) 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ, L. 295. 
63 
 See for e.g. Daniel Esty, "Non-Governmental Organizations At The World Trade Organization: Cooperation, 
Competition, Or Exclusion" (1998) 1 J. mt. Econ. Law; Richard Shell, "The Trade Stake-Holders Model and 
Participation by Non-State Participants" (1996) 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 359; Steve Charnovitz, "Participation of 
Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization" (1996) 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ, L. 331 (1996). But 
see JL Dunoff, "The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO" (1998) 1 J. mt. Econ. Law 443. 
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Here the assumed function and purpose of the WTO is to ensure that international trade remains 
free according to economic theory - an economic functionalist understanding of the WTO. 
Institutional-centric arguments characterized a state-centric approach as "anachronistic" in light 
of the interdependency of issues that can only be addressed on a global scale via international 
institutions. The institutional-centric scholars' confidence in the WTO stemmed from beliefs that 
the WTO was necessary, able to make domestic governments more democratic, and able to 
effectively address global issues - an institutional functionalist understanding of the WTO. 
2. POST-1999 
After 1999, the ideas and interests underlying the debate shifted and the arguments for 
transparency and participation increased and diversified. The issue of transparency is often 
linked with participation without any sharp distinctions between the two concepts. A large 
number of articles take the position that the WTO needs to be more transparent and allow for the 
participation of non-governmental actors. Scholars are not responding so much to state-centric 
critiques against non-governmental actor participation (even though arguments often include 
responses to some of those critiques). They are, instead, primarily reacting against the notion that 
in the days of the GATT, the trade regime operated like a "club" of a small number of like-
minded relatively rich countries who negotiated in seclusion and made all the global trading 
rules.  64  There is a general consensus that the "club model" is inherently illegitimate for its 
secrecy and elitism; the debate centers on legitimating the WTO through mechanisms of 
transparency and participation. Arguments for inclusion of non-governmental actors do not 
necessarily imply a desire to allow non-govermuental actors to have any substantive influence on 
the function and purpose of the WTO .65  Reasons for increased transparency and participation 
include: substantively altering the WTO, 66  educating the public about the benefits of free trade, 
participation and transparency, 67 or domestically pressuring governments for increased 
transparency.68  The types of transparency prescribed also differs. They include what I call 
external transparency (how well do citizens and civil society have access to seeing how the WTO 
functions), internal transparency (are smaller and developing countries able to participate in the 
WTO and have access to negotiations and information), and regulatory transparency (how well 
64 
 Robert 0, Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., "The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation", in Roger B. Porter et al., 
eds., Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium (2001) 264. 
65 
 Cf Jeffrey L. Dunoff,  "Civil Society at the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion?" (2000) 7 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 
275. 
66 
 See for e.g. James Gathii, "Process and Substance in WTO Reform" 29004) 56 Rutgers L. Rev, 885. 
67 
 See for e.g. Sungjoon Cho, "A Quest For WTO's Legitimacy" (2005), 4 World Trade Rev. 391. 
68 
 See for e.g. Sylvia Ostry, "WTO: Institutional Design For Better Governance", in Roger B. Porter et al, eds., 
Efficiency, Equity, And Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System At The Millennium 361(2001); and Sylvia 
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does the WTO ensure national governments incorporate mechanisms of transparency as a central 
feature of domestic legal systems). 
The state-centric view draws from an economic functionalist conception of the WTO and argues 
for non-governmental actors to get involved in order to discipline state action. Whereas the 
institutional-centric view draws from an institutional functionalist conception and argues for 
non-governmental actors to get involved in order to directly change the WTO. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
- 
SHIFT FROM DESIRE TO APPREHENSION 
I have summarized below in a table the pre- and post-1999 arguments regarding non-
governmental actor participation and WTO transparency. 
I Pre-1999 I Post-1999 I 
1. State-Centric Arguments 
- Concerned with making the state a 
more capable and legitimate site of 
global governance 
- 
Economic functionalist conception 
of WTO 
- Non-governmental actors' role is to 
be limited to state and not disrupt 
the WTO's functioning 
2. Institutional-Centric Arguments 
- Concerned with making the WTO a 
more capable and legitimate site of 
global governance 
- Institutional functionalist 
conception of the WTO 
- Non-governmental actors' role is be 
involved within WTO to affect 
matters of global governance  
1. State-Centric Arguments 
- Concerned with the state's inherent 
incapacity as a site of global 
governance via international trade 
policy 
- Economic functionalist conception 
of WTO 
- Focus on external or regulatory 
transparency 
- Reason for transparency and non-
governmental participation is to 
work in tandem with the WTO to 
ensure the state is disciplined 
towards the "correct" economic 
2. Institutional-Centric Arguments 
- Concerned with the detrimental 
effects of WTO as a site of global 
governance 
- Institutional functionalist 
conception of the WTO 
- Focus on external or internal 
transparency 
- Reason for transparency and non-
governmental participation is to 
work against or ameliorate the 
WTO' s detrimental effects 
Table 5.1: Summary of participation and transparency arguments 
There is a shift in why commentators focus discussion on the state. At first, the concern stemmed 
from a desire to make the state a strong site of global governance. After 1999, the concern for the 
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state shifts to building upon the assumption that the state is inherently a weak site of global 
governance. A pre-1999 state-centric argument places non-governmental actors primarily in the 
domestic forum assuming that they can best support the WTO by not interfering with its 
operation. Post-1999, non-governmental actors are called upon to support the WTO, whether 
domestically or internationally, in disciplining the state. Regardless of the shifts in state-centric 
arguments, what remains consistent is an economic functionalist conception of the WTO. The 
corollary is that the assumed purpose for non-governmental actors remains consistent - they are 
to encourage the liberalization of trade. What differs are arguments as to where and how to 
achieve this goal. 
Similarly, there is also a shift in why commentators focus discussion on the WTO. The concern 
begins as a desire to make the WTO a strong institution of global governance. After 1999, the 
concern with the WTO becomes a response to the assumption that the WTO is detrimental to 
some people's daily lives. The consistent dynamic underlying the shift is supposing that the 
WTO is an institution that has global effect and that non-governmental actors must therefore get 
involved to engage with this institution. The institutional functionalist conception of the function 
and purpose of the WTO remains the same between the two periods; what differs is whether the 
outlook towards the WTO's effects is optimistic or pessimistic. What also differs is that pre-1999 
there is an ambiguity regarding the role of the state in global governance - the call for a more 
legitimate WTO can incorporate either support for the state or skepticism towards the state. After 
1999, the assumption is that the state should and does matter with regards to everyday life, and in 
light of the effects of WTO upon the state, we must reconsider how should the state matter. 
Looking more closely at Table 5.1, there is an ironic turn from pre- to post-1999 arguments 
revealing that prescribed roles for non-governmental actors do not necessarily stem from the 
same conceptions of the WTO. A call for increased non-governmental actor participation and 
WTO transparency can stem from either: 1) an institutional functionalist conception celebrating 
the WTO as a site of global governance that is ambivalent about the role of the state (pre-1999 
institutional centric); or 2) an economic functionalist conception of the WTO that is skeptical of 
the state's role in matters of global governance (post-1999 state centric). Likewise, a 
consideration that non-governmental actors should not work within or alongside the WTO can 
stem from either: 1) an institutional functionalist conception that is worried about the WTO's 
effect on the role of the state in daily life, thereby supportive of non-governmental action that 
ameliorates the WTO's effect (post-1999 institutional centric); or 2) an economic functionalist 
conception of the WTO that is confident in its economic benefits and skeptical of non-
governmental participation beyond the state (pre-1999 state centric). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The unfortunate effect of the contestations and justifications of the WTO's legitimacy has been 
the obscuring of normative assumptions underpinning conceptions of the WTO. One suspects 
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that the more the discourse continues in this tug-of-war of legitimacy, the more entangled our 
understanding of the WTO will be. Thus, by reconstruing the legitimacy debates towards a 
development debate, we gain a better sense of what conceptions of the WTO are dominating 
legal thought. What first emerges is that there are economic functionalist and institutional 
functionalist conception of the WTO 's purpose. What is then discerned is that each conception 
corresponds to a particular development framework. 
This article goes on to show that a particular conception of the WTO does not necessarily 
correspond to a particular development framework. The context of a the particular legitimacy 
debate determines how a conception of the WTO is linked to a particular development 
framework because each debate is examining a particular dynamic among the WTO, the market, 
non-governmental actors, and the state. 
With these sharper analytical tools in mind, I suggest we engage in a more substantive and 
detailed debate as to what the function and purpose of the WTO should be rather than debate 
how to improve the WTO' s legitimacy based on predicated conceptions of the WTO. This may 
allow for a more productive way of imagining the WTO as a development institution. 

